Le mythe de la bonne guerre des américains – Seconde guerre mondiale et rôle des américains.

Comme toujours il est nécessaire d’interroger toute vision simpliste de l’histoire en lui soumettant des versions alternatives, révisionnistes. De cette démarche découle l’esprit critique. Cette vidéo est très intéressante. Je vous invite à la regarder et à lire le livre de l’auteur.

Juste quelques semaines après l’anniversaire du débarquement des américains en France en 1944, cette vidéo est plus que jamais d’actualité. Je vous signale la lecture révisionniste de l’histoire de la guerre froide qui la fait débuter en 1917 et non pas en 1945. A vous souvenir que John Reed était un journaliste américain, à regarder la lutte contre les communistes dans le film J.Edgar avec Leonardo Di Caprio lors du début du film, à vous rappeler le rôle des guerres dans l’enrichissement des Etats-Unis, l’arrivée du système de Bretton Woods. Enfin, les américains reconnaissaient que le régime nazi avait le mérite :

1. D’avoir maté le communisme

2. D’avoir sorti l’Allemagne de la crise économique

3. D’être un bon partenaire commercial pour les grosses entreprises américaines (Ford, General Motors, IBM, Coca Cola notamment mais pas que…)

Tout ceci explique l’arrivée tardive des américains dans la seconde guerre mondiale. En fait il est fort probable que les américains ne se soient décidés à intervenir que tardivement tout simplement pour éviter que l’URSS ne prenne toute l’Europe sous son joug politique. Car ce sont davantage les russes que les américains qui ont gagné la guerre contre l’Allemagne nazie. Ce sont les blindés et l’armée soviétique qui est arrivée à Berlin en premier. Enfin, lourd fardeau démographique, les russes ont perdu des MILLIONS d’hommes sur le front est contre l’Allemagne, c’est d’ailleurs ce qui leur a permis de vaincre l’armée nazie : leur forte réserve démographique comparé à la petite Allemagne.

Le mythe de la bonne guerre – Vidéo Dailymotion.

Short selling : what does it mean in stock markets

Hi everybody.

I followed yesterday an interesting courses on Khan Academy on short selling. Here is the video. The main idea and meaning of short selling is :

When you think that the price of one share is going to decrease …

1. You rent a share through a broker. This broker has this share between it has plenty of clients and among them, there are clients who the very share on which you want to bet and to short sells.

2. You sell it immediately right away, before the price actually goes down.

3. You wait until the price is low

4. And then you cover your position buying this same share at a low price.

Basic shorting: Basic Shorting

Shorting stock: What does it mean to short a stock?

Shorting stock 2: More on the mechanics of shorting stock.

I have been trading through the online French bank “Boursorama” for a few months and I am currently wondering whether S.R.D. is the same thing as Short Sells. I may be the same principles but I am not sure enough.

And then you will enjoy below a video on the impact of short selling in stock markets in general. Are they making markets safer or not ?

Is short selling bad?: A discussion of the virtues and/or vices of short selling.

How Does All This Fit Together?

Let’s go back to the ECB. If a negative interest rate exists, the bank no longer pays you interest to encourage you to keep your money with them. They now control all your monetary transactions, and you cannot function without them. The servant has become the master. Therefore, it would not be possible to cease to use the bank for your transactions, should their “negative interest rates” start to climb.

At this point, the government and the bank would, between them, control your money totally. You would find yourself, in effect, “owned by the company store.” It’s even possible that bank fees and tax rates could be increased as your income increased, so that you might never be able to truly save money, invest, or indeed, act independently of your “owners.” The flow of your money would have become centralised, and you could not function without them.

Of course, this is all theory. Surely, this could not come to pass, because people inherently do not wish to be enslaved.

And yet it happened on a wholesale basis in Kentucky and other mining areas in the US. So the question really is, “How did it become possible that people in mining towns volunteered for their own slavery?”

First there was a depression. Many people lost their jobs and their incomes and were prepared to do anything in order to feed their families. So they signed up for the only game in town: the mines. It was dangerous work, there were no benefits, and the coal dust would kill a miner after a time. But as long as he lived, his family had enough to eat. He accepted the deal, because (again) it was the only game in town.

So, back to the present day, where the Greater Depression will soon be on us in full force. A large percentage of jobs will be destroyed, but in addition, this time around, the currency will also be destroyed. In order to pay for goods, particularly food, people will do whatever they have to, to obtain currency. Desperate times, indeed.

But there’s a light at the end of the tunnel! The government has chosen to eliminate bank notes and coins, as they ultimately proved to be so destructive. Never again will this be allowed to happen. The new Electronic Currency System will assure that all money is centrally managed.

The press will declare the new system brilliant, and the harder an individual has been hit by the Greater Depression, the more quickly he will jump on board. The greedy rich have all but destroyed his life, and his government, like a knight in shining armour, has come to save him. Like the miner, he will not be musing on how this will all play out over the decades; he will opt for the promise of relief for his family now.

If this all plays out as described above, it will not be just Kentucky, but entire nations.

Editor’s note: The day after this article was written, the ECB announced the introduction of a negative interest rate: 0.1% on deposits. As predicted, the media have already begun to the praise the measure.

International man publication about ECB negative interest rates for bank’s deposit

Negative Interest Rates

Let’s put the song aside for the moment and have a look at a concept that has been bandied about by the European Central Bank (ECB) for a while now. Since the collapse of the central banks would doom the world (their claim, not mine), it is essential that the banks be saved no matter what else must be sacrificed. Efforts to “save” the situation have been implemented through quantitative easing (QE) and the setting and continuation of low interest rates.

Unfortunately, in spite of record profits by banks and staggering bonuses handed out to senior bank executives, somehow the QE and low interest rates have not created the prosperity desired. The economy is still in the tank. What to do?

A solution being considered is to create “negative interest rates.” Sounds logical, doesn’t it? If low interest rates have kept the economy from crashing but haven’t fixed it, surely, negative interest rates can only be more positive.

And what are negative interest rates? Well, it simply means that, if you keep your money in a bank, instead of the bank paying you interest, you pay the bank to hold your money.

No central bank has ever done such a thing, so, not surprisingly, it sounds like a bitter pill to swallow. However, the ECB will present it as an “unfortunate necessity.”

E.C.B action won’t bring much relief

This article is from the international herald tribune, from Anatole Kaletsky. It seems interesting to me because it helps me to understand the intimate mechanisms of quantitative easing and also the concept of negative interest rates.

Anatole Kaletsky is an journalist but also an economic analyst.

At last, the European Central Bank seems ready to shoot some adrenalin into the moribund euro zone economy.

After a news conference last week, when Mario Draghi strongly hinted at action to come after the E.C.B. council meeting in June 5, this week brought a host of interviews and media leaks describing quite specifically the new ideas the bank has in mind.

The measure, which is almost a foregone conclusion, will be a cut in the interest rate the E.C.B. pays on bank deposits from zero to negative 0.1 percent or 0.2 percent. Beyond that, E.C.B. officials have suggested several additional stimulus measures : extension of loans to commercial banks at very low fixed rates for three or even five years, purchases by the E.C.B. of bank loans to small and midsize enterprises packaged into asset-backed securities, and concessional lending to European banks on condition that they pass on these funds to those businesses. These announcements generated quite a lot of enthusiasm : The euro weakened from almost $1.40 to $1.37, bond yields in Italy and Spain fell to record lows and European stock markets jumped between 1 and 2 percent. On Wednesday the market reaction even crossed the Altlantic, with interest rates on United States Treasury bonds falling to their lowest levels in six months.

Sadly, however, investors may be overexcited about E.C.B.’s plans. Even assuming all the reports about the plans turn out to be true – and several times recently the E.C.B. has not followed through on similar rumors – it is far from clear that these policies would have much impact on the big economic problems facing the euro zone : feeble economic growth and mass unemployment, a continuing credit crunch for small and midsize enterprises in southern Europe, huge imbalances in competitiveness between Germany and the rest of the euro zone, and deflationary pressures that create debt traps and balance sheet recessions in the peripheral economies.

A negative interest rate on deposits, the measure that has been watched closely, is unlikely to have much effect for two reasons.

First, the banks that have excess cash to park at the E.C.B. are by definition the stronger ones, most of them in Germany, France and northern European countries. These banks do not need further incentives to lend to their customers, because credit is readily available to both businesses and households in those countries.

The credit crunch that needs to relieved is in Italy, Spain and other peripheral countries – and the bnks in these economies are generally much weaker. Their reluctance to lend to customers is mainly due to their lack of capital, not their eagerness to hoard cash at the E.C.B. If negative E.C.B. deposit rates now eliminate the meager profits these institutions can earn by placing excess liquidity in the interbank market, their capital positions may, on balance, deteriorate, and it is hard to see how this would increase their ability to lend.

Second, although negative interest rates may grad media headlines, there is nothing magical about their economic effect. This has been demonstrated by the experience in Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland, where negative interest rates have been used to discourage excessive capital inflows and to try to weaken currencies that were deemed too strong. In all these cases, the effects of imposing what amounts to a small tax on bank deposits turned out to be quite modest.

To achieve the desired results, negative rates had to be supplemented with other measures, like foreign exchange intervention or aggressive expansion of the central balance sheets, which amounted in one day or another to “printing money” and using it to by government bonds.

And printing money to buy government bonds, in the manner of American, British and Japanese quantitative easing, is the one kind of measure still ruled out for Europe by German opposition, as Jens Weidmann, the Bundesbank president, confirmed this week.

To be more precise, Mr. Weidmann has ruled out easing in Europe unless and until the other measures now planned for the E.C.B. have been tried and found wanting. The problem with the step-by-step approach favored by the E.C.B. under pressure from the Bundesbank is that every step taken becomes an excuse for delaying the next step. Experience suggests that E.C.B. economists may be well spend months analyzing and studying the consequences of negative deposit rates before they decide to move onto other measures such as purchasing small and midsize enterprise loans.

And even if the E.C.B. does move faster than than in the past and announces a package next month combining both negative interest rates and business loans, this may not do much for southern Europe without action to encourage investment and spending by businesses and consumers, as well as increasing the availability of credit by easing the regulatory pressure on undercapitalized banks.

What would really help these countries would be a relaxation of fiscal policies or a direct injection of government-backed mortgages that transformed the British economy.

Unfortunately, neither fiscal easing nor any kind of government-backed credit expansion seems to be an option for southern Europe, because it would directly conflict with the deficit-reduction programs and bank restructuring regimes imposed by the European Commission and E.C.B.

The upshot is that E.C.B. action will probably prove just sufficient to prevent the euro zone economy from deteriorating any further, and the attainment of this stability will be offered as a reason not to do anything more ambitious, either by way of monetary stimulus or the easing of fiscal and regulatory constraints. A continuation of Japanese-style stagnation thus seems the most likely prospect for most of Europe despite, or perhaps because of, the half-hearted action that can now be expected from the E.C.B.

WELCOME To this site & blog about me and finance and the EU.